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Oversupply has posed a number of problems for the Australian wine industry in recent times. 
When disaggregated from the industry level, however, the problem can be better described as 
a  range  of  attribute-specific  disequilibria.  To  date,  solutions  to  this  problem  have 
predominantly revolved around reducing output through crop thinning or vine pulling. This 
paper  proposes  a  different  approach  by  suggesting  that  disequilibria  may  be  reduced  by 
gaining a better understanding of the demand for Australian wine. A discrete choice model of 
product  differentiation  is  used  to  estimate  the  demand  for  wine  in  the  United  States, 
Australia’s second largest export market. Implications of the analysis are explored. 
 




Oversupply  has  emerged  as  a  central  problem  facing  the  Australian  wine  industry  in 
recent times.  Increases in area under vine  and  a number of record grape  yields have 
caused grape and wine output to exceed levels required to satisfy domestic and export 
markets. This has had a significant negative impact on wine producers and the industry as 
a  whole.  Some  of  Australia’s  largest  wine  companies  have  reported  considerable 
financial  losses,  which  have  been  largely  attributed  to  oversupply  (Freed  2005). 
However, very little research has been conducted on how Australian producers can best 
address the problem. This study attempts to bridge the gap. 
Industry  analysts  use  the  stock-to-sales  ratio  to  gauge  the  size  and  nature  of 
supply-demand  imbalances  in  the  market.  McGrath-Kerr  (2003)  defines  the  ratio’s 
“comfort zone”, or equilibrium range, to be between 1.5 and 1.75. As can be seen in 
Figure 1, the industry, at an aggregate level, is currently in a state of oversupply. 
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Figure 1 Stock-to-Sales Ratio, 1994-2005 
Source: McGrath-Kerr (2003; 2005), ABS (1998; 2005) 
 
  Wine is a highly differentiated product. There arguably exist no two wines in any 
one market that are identical. Therefore, it is probable that when the aggregate problem of 
oversupply  is  broken  down  to  a  more  attribute-specific  level,  the  complexity  of  the 
problem  will  increase  considerably.  Figure  1  supports  this  observation,  with  red  and 
white wine exhibiting different natures of disequilibrium. Over the past 10 years white 
wine  has  often  experienced  excess  demand,  while  red  wine  has  been  clearly  in 
oversupply. Davis (2005) found that when the industry was disaggregated further, the 
level and nature of disequilibrium became increasingly diverse. 
Many reasons appear to be responsible for the recent trend toward industry-wide 
oversupply.  The  most  significant  of  these  include  Federal  Government  taxation 
incentives  available  to  new  grape  growers,  lucrative  supply  contracts  targeting 
prospective growers and a mismatching of research and development to the issues that 
are most important to the industry’s health. 
It is argued that solving this oversupply problem may be best achieved through a 
better understanding the demand for Australian wine. In contrast to this approach, supply-
side policies, including crop thinning and reduction in grape vine area  are inherently   4 
contractionary  in  nature.  However,  better  matching  Australia’s  production  regime  to 
consumer preferences using demand analysis may lead to the reduction of disequilibrium, 
while  simultaneously  promoting  industry  growth.  Given  wine’s  highly  heterogeneous 
nature,  a  model  of  product  differentiation  has  been  chosen  to  analyse  consumer 
preferences in one of Australia’s largest export markets, the United States. 
  Section  2  will  provide an  overview  of  the  literature.  The  theoretical  model  is 
detailed in Section 3, with the corresponding empirical model being outlined in Section 4. 
Results  are  presented  in  Section  5,  followed  by  policy  implications  and  concluding 
comments in Sections 6 and 7. 
 
2. Previous studies 
The vast majority of the empirical wine demand literature has employed hedonic pricing 
methods. One reason for this is likely to be the less stringent data requirements and the 
method’s focus on product attributes rather then the final good. Another method that has 
been employed to study wine demand is the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS). No 
previous application of product differentiation theory appears to have been made to wine 
markets. 
  Hedonic price analysis involves the regression of price on product attributes, in 
order  to  estimate  implicit  attribute-level  prices.  The  theory  underlying  the  method  is 
derived  from  Lancaster  (1971)’s  “new  approach”  to  demand  theory,  and  was  later 
formalised  as  the  hedonic  method  by  Rosen  (1974).  Schamel  and  Anderson’s  (2003) 
estimation  of  a  hedonic  price  function  provides  a  good  example  of  the  method’s 
application to wine. The model provides price premiums and discounts for the major 
attributes  that  are  known  to  the  consumer  at the  time  of  purchase,  including  variety, 
region and vintage. Other literature adopting a similar modelling specification include 
Oczkowski (1994), Combris et al. (1997), Schamel (2000), Oczkowski (2001), Steiner 
(2004) and Noev (2005).  
Unwin (1999) provides a comprehensive critique of hedonic pricing applications 
to wine. One of the most significant limitations of the hedonic approach is its inability to 
be used as a demand model. Hedonic models estimate equilibrium implicit prices for 
product attributes, which are inherently determined jointly by supply and demand factors.   5 
Coefficients  cannot,  therefore,  be  interpreted  solely  as  indicators  of  consumer 
preferences. Applications of the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) to wine include 
such analyses as Moosa and Baxter (2002), Eakins and Gallagher (2003) and Seale et al. 
(2003). Seale et al. (2003) attempted to explain the disproportionate growth of imported 
red wine sales in the US market, relative to the domestically produced product. Unlike 
hedonic price analysis, however, these analyses were not conducted at an attribute level. 
Other demand models used to study wine have predominantly included simple 
linear  demand  equation  estimation,  nearly  all  of  which  have  been  conducted  at  an 
“overall  product”  level.  For  example,  Owen  (1979)  used  a  log-linear  consumption 
function  to  estimate  the  demand  for  wine  in  Australia  between  1955  and  1977.  The 
results showed that Australia’s income elasticity of demand for wine was much greater 
than many Old World wine producing countries (including France, Italy, Portugal, Spain, 
and West Germany), most likely reflecting wine’s emerging nature in Australia at the 
time. Other analyses of wine demand, including Clements and Johnson (1983), Tegene 
(1990) and Selvanathan and Selvanathan (2004), provided similar results, with varying 
research objectives. The results obtained from these analyses provide some interesting 
insight into the way in which the consumer base as a whole approaches the product. 
However, like the AIDS studies, the applicability of the results to industry disequilibrium 
problems  is  hampered  by  both  their  “aggregate”  product-level  nature,  and  restrictive 
market structure assumptions.  
Discrete  choice  analysis  provides  a  popular  means  of  studying  product 
differentiation. Pompelli and Heien (1991) use a discrete choice model in their analysis of 
white wine demand in the United States. The analysis was an application of Heckman’s 
(1976) two-step method. Despite the model having a discrete choice element, the demand 
modelling component (the second stage) is a simple product level analysis similar to 
those discussed above. Therefore, it does not capture product differentiation due to its 
aggregated nature.  
  Overall, many of the models used in the previous literature, such as hedonic price 
analysis and the AIDS model, appear inadequate in analysing consumer preferences for a 
heterogeneous good such as wine. James and Alston (2002) make this point by noting 
that the majority of economic policy analysis is conducted using models of homogenous   6 
products, and that policy effects estimated using such models are likely to be significantly 
different from those derived from product differentiation models. However, it appears 
that the empirical literature has virtually ignored this important observation. Therefore, in 
order  for  plausible  policy  recommendations  to  be  derived,  it  is  desirable  that  future 
studies  of  the  demand  for  Australian  wine  be  based  on  the  theory  of  product 
differentiation. 
 
3. Demand under product differentiation 
The theoretical framework is based on Berry’s (1994) nested logit discrete choice model. 
This model is identical in effect to the traditional nested logit, but differs in estimation 
method used. In general terms, the use of market share data, which is more aggregated 
than the individual data required for the traditional estimation, allows for the model’s 
functional form to be linear. 
  A nesting structure is constructed to reflect the grouping of like product attributes. 
The nesting structure used for one of the models in this paper is shown in Figure 2.  
 
 
Figure 2 Nested logit structure for the US wine market 
 
An efficient grouping exists where the correlation of preferences is high within 
nests but low between nests. The econometric rationale for this grouping relates to the 
independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption, which must hold in the basic 
multinomial logit model. The IIA assumption states that any alternative not included in 
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the choice set is considered to have no impact on the consumer decision. The nested logit 
model allows this restrictive assumption to be relaxed within nests but requires it to hold 
among them. Therefore, the restriction can effectively be “assumed away” if the tree 
structure is efficient. The choice between an outside good and inside good makes up the 
first tier of the tree structure. Given that the consumer chooses the inside good, a choice 
is made between attribute “groups”, which constitute the second tier of the tree structure.  
  Following  the  model  outlined  in  detail  by  Deng (2003),  consumer  i  at  time t 
chooses among J+1 alternatives, where J = the number of specific wines in the market. In 
the case of the tree structure in Figure 2, the product groupings are quality segments. Let 
the respective groups be denoted as g = 1,…,5. The set of wines in group g is denoted Mg. 
g∈G, where G = {0,1,…,5). The outside good, j = 0, is the only component of group 0. 
The utility for alternative j∈Mg obtained by consumer i is 
(1)    ( ) (1 ) ij j j j ig g g ij u x p β α ξ γ σ σ ε = − + + + −  
where  ,  and  j j j x p ξ are observed product attributes, unobserved product attributes, and 
price, respectively. β and α  are demand parameters, that will be estimated by the model. 
ij ε  is assumed to be the identically and independently distributed extreme value error 
term over each of the product variants, J, and  ig γ follows a unique distribution such that 
( ) (1 ) ig g g ij γ σ σ ε + −  is an extreme value random variable conditional on  ij ε also being an 
extreme  value  random  variable  (Deng  2003,  p.6;  Cardell  1997).  g σ is  a  correlation 
coefficient  of  consumer  tastes  within  group  g.  Therefore,  this  coefficient  explains 
consumer heterogeneity within a specified group of products. As  g σ  approaches unity, 
consumers tend toward homogeneity. A value closer to zero indicates that consumers are 
highly diverse in their tastes within the corresponding group. 
  Equation 1 can be written as 
(2)    ( ) (1 ) ij j ig g g ij u δ γ σ σ ε = + + −  
where  j δ is the mean utility level of variant j, and is equal to  j j j x p β α ξ − + . 
  Following Berry (1994), the logit model, when estimated with market share data, 
can be expressed as    8 

















with the mean utility of the outside good normalised to zero, the model can be simplified 
as 
(4)    0 ln( ) ln( ) j j j j j s s x p δ β α ξ − = ≡ − +  
Casting the above logit model into a nested form allows the estimation of correlation 
terms for products that lie within the groups defined in the nested structure of the model. 
In the estimated function (Equation 11), this is the coefficient on the sj/g variable defined 
as 
(5)   
/(1 )



















= ∑ . 
The term Dg is known as the “inclusive value” as it captures the utility of all products 
within group g (Deng 2003). The market share of group g can then be written as 
(6)   
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  Multiplying the within group share, sj/g, and the group share, sg, yields the market 
share of product j: 
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Berry (1994) identifies the outside good as the only product in group 0, with  0 0 δ ≡  and 
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An expression for mean utility levels can then be derived by taking logs of market shares   9 
(8)    0 ln( ) ln( )











Solving for Dg is achieved by taking the log of the group share (Equation 6), that is  
(9)   
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(10)    / 0 ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) j j j g s s s δ σ = − − . 
Rearranging (10) provides a linear equation, equivalent to the logit model in (4) 
(11)    0 / ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) j j j g j g j s s x p s β α σ ξ − = − + + . 
Estimates  of  ,   and  β α σ   can  be  obtained  through  a  linear  instrumental  variable 
regression, using an estimator such as two stage least squares. 
  Having estimated equation (11), the coefficients can be used to calculate own and 
cross price elasticities  at the attribute level. Deng  (2003) defines these elasticities as 
follows 
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  Deng (2003) suggests that group g  and group h can be the same or different, and 
if  g h ≠ , the cross price elasticity across groups is equal to  k k p s α . 
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4. Data and estimation procedures 
Two models are estimated, differing primarily in terms of nesting structure. Steven Berry 
(pers.  comm.,  2006)  suggests  that  a  nesting  structure  defined  by  price  may  be 
problematic, as price is not a “fundamental component of the good”. Therefore, both a 
“quality” nesting structure (based on price as shown in Figure 2) and a “region of origin” 
nesting structure have been used in the analysis. 
Scanner data have been sourced from ACNielsen and comprise US wine sales 
occurring in grocery and drug stores for the years 2003, 2004 and 2005. The grocery 
store sector represents 44% of the total US market sales, while the drug store sector 
makes up 8%. In total, these sectors cover 52% of the total US wine sales. The data cover 
only off-premise sales which constitute 79% of total sales (ACNielsen 2004). Therefore 
the total market coverage of the data is equal to 41%.  
Initial estimation of the model using all available data  yielded underestimated 
price coefficients, according to various industry and academic opinions (Clements 2006; 
John Asker, pers. comm., 2006). Following a cluster analysis of the data, it was found 
that there existed a large number of observations with low prices and low sales, most 
likely a result of distribution inefficiencies and loyalty to established brands. To account 
for this, the model was estimated using data on the top 50 brands (according to total 
brand sales) only, thereby omitting observations with both low sales and low prices. The 
omitted observations accounted for 24% of sales in the original dataset. This may present 
an illusion of sample selection bias, given that the largest brands only are retained in the 
dataset. However, this is simply a truncated sample, as used by Nevo (2001), and is not of 
concern from a selection bias perspective. This is supported further by Nevo (2000), 
stating that since the majority of activity occurs within these brands, it is logical that they 
be the focus of a study of market behaviour.  For this exercise, the market has been 
defined as the total US market for wine. The outside good is, therefore, the proportion of 
the total wine market not represented by the dataset outlined above.  
The data are at a wine-specific level. That is, each specific branded wine is a 
separate observation in the dataset (not including wines that have repeated sales across 
the three years in the sample). Aggregate sales per nine litre case of wine are available, as 
well as the average 750ml bottle (or equivalent) price. The data also include container   11 
size,  value  and  description  of  product  attributes  such  as  grape  variety  and  region  of 
origin.  
The nesting structures used consist of either quality segments or regions of origin. 
Wine quality is defined by price segments outlined by Heijbroek (2003) (Table 1). These 
categories have been converted from Euros to US Dollars using the 2003 Purchasing 
Power Parity (PPP) adjusted exchange rate sourced from the World Bank Development 
Indicators  database  (WBDI  2006).  Upon  preliminary  estimation  using  this  quality 
specification, it was found that the nesting was more robust if the “Icon” segment was 
aggregated  with  the  “Ultra  Premium”  segment.  Therefore,  in  the  quality  nesting, 
segments are as outlined in Table 1, with the exception of “Ultra Premium” consisting of 
all wines with a price exceeding $12.60. 
 
Table 1 Quality segments, defined by price 
Quality Segment  US Dollars per 750ml Bottle 
Basic  < $2.70 
Popular Premium  $2.70 to $4.50 
Premium  $4.50 to $6.30 
Super Premium  $6.30 to $12.60 
Ultra Premium  $12.60 to $135 
Icon  > $135 
Source: Heijbroek (2003) 
 
The regional nesting structure is based on the country from which the wine is 
imported  into  the  United  States.  To  simplify  the  estimation  process,  European  wine 
producers  (including  France,  Germany  and  Italy)  have  been  aggregated  into  a  single 
category  named  “Europe”,  and  similarly,  South  American  wine  producers  (including 
Argentina and Chile) have been aggregated into a category named “South America”. The 
remaining regions in the nesting structure are Australia and the United States. 
The Hausman test was used to show that price and group share variables were 
endogenous. Therefore, Equation 16 below was estimated using two stage least squares 
(2SLS) 
(16)    0 / ln( ) ln( ) ln[ ]
j j j g j g j s s x p s γ β α σ ξ − = + + + +    12 
where x is a vector of product characteristics including grape variety and region of origin, 
j represents a particular branded wine, and g represents a market segment, being defined 
by either quality or region of origin, depending on the nesting structure of the respective 
model. 
  Instrumental variables (IVs) obtained for estimation include exchange rates, crop 
and food production indices, container size (bottle/cask) and distance to market for each 
of the exporting countries in the sample. In the case of domestically produced wine an 
exchange rate of “1” and a distance to market of “0” were used. Exchange rate data were 
obtained from the International Monetary Fund (IMF 2006), crop and food indexes were 
obtained  from  the  World  Bank  Development  Indicators  database  (WBDI  2005)  and 
distance to market data were obtained from (Mapcrow 2006). 
Auxiliary regressions for all combinations of IVs were estimated for both model 
specifications outlined above (both quality and regional nesting structures). Key statistics 
from these regressions were examined, including F statistics, R
2 values and individual 
significance levels of each IV. It was found that the most efficient IV combination for the 
quality nesting was exchange rates, crop production index, container size and distance to 
market. For the regional nesting, it was found that container size and distance to market 
were the most appropriate IVs. In both models, instruments were interacted with nesting 
dummies to enable two-stage estimation.  
 
5. Results 
Both the quality and region models were run using a two-stage least squares estimator to 
account  for  endogeneity  of  both  price  and  group  share  variables.  The  group  share 
variables  describe  the  nesting  structure  of  the  model.  The  estimated  coefficients 
associated with these variables explain the correlation of consumer preferences in each 
market segment defined by the nesting structure of the respective model. The results are 
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Table 2 Demand parameters 
Quality nesting    Region nesting 
Dep var: lnSj-lnSo  Coefficient 
Standard 
error    Dep var: lnSj-lnSo  Coefficient 
Standard 
error 
             
Constant  -4.85***  0.82    Constant  -5.35***  0.31 
Year 2004  -0.04  0.03    Year 2004  -0.03  0.06 
Year 2005  -0.04  0.03    Year 2005  -0.10*  0.06 
Price  -0.11***  0.02    Price  -0.27***  0.03 
Merlot  0.16*  0.09    Merlot  0.60***  0.12 
Burgundy  0.14  0.10    Burgundy  -0.35*  0.19 
Cabernet Sauvignon  0.25***  0.07    Cabernet Sauvignon  0.88***  0.15 
Cabernet Sauvignon Merlot  0.08  0.09    Cabernet Sauvignon Merlot  0.33  0.26 
Paisano  0.76***  0.25    Paisano  0.90***  0.21 
Zinfandel  -0.18***  0.06    Zinfandel  -0.24  0.15 
Pinot Noir  0.08  0.08    Pinot Noir  0.66***  0.16 
Chianti  0.08  0.10    Chianti  -0.35*  0.20 
Generic Red Wine  -0.11  0.16    Generic Red Wine  -0.86**  0.35 
White Grenache  -0.42***  0.16    White Grenache  -1.70***  0.32 
Rose  -0.20*  0.12    Rose  -1.07***  0.26 
Blush  0.28*  0.15    Blush  -0.11  0.26 
White Zinfandel  0.09  0.08    White Zinfandel  -0.20  0.14 
Generic White Wine  -0.32*  0.19    Generic White Wine  -1.01**  0.43 
Rhine  0.15  0.11    Rhine  -0.37*  0.22 
Pinot Grigio  0.03  0.06    Pinot Grigio  -0.11  0.13 
Sauvignon Blanc  -0.01  0.05    Sauvignon Blanc  -0.12  0.13 
Chablis  0.22*  0.12    Chablis  -0.17  0.20 
Chardonnay  0.10  0.07    Chardonnay  0.43***  0.11 
Other Wine  -0.18***  0.07    Other Wine  -0.46***  0.13 
Australia  0.59**  0.25         
Chile  0.44*  0.24         
France  0.40*  0.23         
Germany  0.60**  0.27         
Italy  0.43*  0.23         
United States  0.55**  0.25         
             
lnSj/g (Basic)  0.74***  0.07    lnSj/g (Australia)  0.57***  0.06 
lnSj/g (Popular Premium)  0.80***  0.07    lnSj/g (South America)  0.89***  0.07 
lnSj/g (Premium)  0.79***  0.07    lnSj/g (Europe)  0.64***  0.06 
lnSj/g (Super Premium)  0.76***  0.07    lnSj/g (United States)  0.46***  0.05 
lnSj/g (Ultra Premium)  0.94***  0.08         
             
R
2=0.93  R
2adj=0.93  DW=2.04        R
2=0.69  R
2adj=0.69  DW=1.99    
F statistic = 2244.01        F statistic = 493.16     
             
       ***, ** and * signify 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance, respectively. 
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  The  group  share  correlation  coefficients  in  the  quality  model  indicate  that 
consumer preferences are relatively heterogeneous for the lowest four quality segments, 
with preferences being notably more similar in the Ultra Premium segment. Within the 
lowest four quality segments, the Popular Premium and Premium groups have relatively 
high levels of consumer homogeneity, particularly when compared to the Basic segment. 
This  may  be  explained  by  the  level  of  wine  knowledge  that  consumers  possess  at 
different quality levels in the market. Wine knowledge is likely to increase with quality, 
leading  to  a  corresponding  increase  in  the  homogeneity  of  consumer  tastes.  With 
increased wine knowledge often comes a convergence to a common idea of what specific 
characteristics create a “good wine”. However, at lower quality segments consumers have 
less wine knowledge, but in many cases they have a greater number of product variants to 
choose from. These two factors combined lead to preferences being more “sporadic” in 
lower quality segments, hence increasing the level of observed consumer heterogeneity. 
  The results from the region model suggest that Australian and US wine consumers 
are the most heterogeneous. Consumers of South American wine appear, however, to be 
the  most  homogenous.  This  result  may  be  explained  by  the  perceived  low  level  of 
product  diversity  in  South  American  wines.  One  may  expect  a  similar  outcome  for 
Australian wine, which anecdotally has a reputation as a generic “value-for-money” wine 
style (AWBC 2007). However, despite this being the case for many Australian wines, 
there  also  exist  a  large  number  of  boutique  variants  in  the  US  market.  This,  in 
combination with the high degree of product differentiation among Australian wines in 
the United States, at all quality levels, has led to increased heterogeneity of consumer 
tastes.  It  is  not  surprising  that  consumers  of  the  domestic  US  product  are  relatively 
heterogeneous. It is in this category that the number of product variants is likely to be 
highest. Furthermore, US consumers will have greater access to boutique products from 
domestic producers than foreign producers who may be prohibited from providing such 
products due to the transaction costs of foreign trade. 
  The coefficients of the product attributes, shown in Table 2, provide some insight 
into the types of wine that US consumers have the greatest preferences for. It should be 
noted that in each of the models estimated, a base variable was used to avoid the dummy 
variable trap. In the quality model, the base variable is “Argentinean Shiraz” sold in   15 
2003. In the region model the base variable is “Shiraz” sold in 2003. Therefore, in each 
case the attributes in the base variables do not exist in the regression output, and all 
coefficients in Table 2 must be interpreted relative to the base variable in the respective 
model.  
  Both  models  suggest  that  US  consumers  have  a  preference  for  Cabernet 
Sauvignon and Merlot grape varieties. These varieties are among those overproduced in 
Australia. Despite Rosé and White Grenache not being preferred by US consumers, it 
appears that Blush, a very similar product technically, is a popular variety among these 
consumers.  This  may  indicate  that  US  consumers  are  “brand  conscious”  and  that 
Australian producers should be open to modifying their product’s branding, regardless of 
any modification of the product itself. The negative coefficients of Generic Red  and 
Generic White wine support this claim. Branding is clearly important if increased market 
share is sought by Australian exporters. 
  The estimated coefficients of regional dummy variables, included in the quality 
model, help to explain the US preferences for wine produced in various countries. With 
the exception of Germany, Australia is the most preferred producer of wine in the United 
States,  implying  that  the  United  States  may  be  a  promising  market  through  which 
Australia could eradicate excess wine stocks. However, wines must be clearly branded as 
“Australian” to take advantage of the preferences revealed in this market. 
  Table 3 provides  attribute level own price elasticities for  each of the product 
attributes presented in the regression output (Table 2), across each year in the sample. 
Table 4 reports price elasticities for each group in the quality model, and similarly, Table 
5 includes elasticities for the region model. These elasticities are presented for each year 
in the sample, as well as an average for each market segment and  year. An average 
elasticity for the entire market, across all time periods, is reported in Tables 4 and 5. The 
elasticities are sales weighted averages of individual brand-specific elasticities that were 
calculated  for  every  specific  wine  in  the  model.  Therefore,  they  are  not  market 
elasticities,  but  rather  represent  the  elasticity  of  the  “average  specific  wine”  in  each 
respective  category.  Due  to  a  higher  degree  of  competition  and  larger  number  of 
substitutes at such a disaggregated level, the magnitude of the elasticities is naturally 
greater than would be the case with aggregate market elasticities.   16 
Table 3 Weighted average attribute level own price elasticities 
Quality Nesting    Region Nesting 
  2003 2004 2005 Average    2003 2004 2005 Average 
Burgundy  -0.81 -0.82 -0.93  -0.85   Burgundy  -0.90 -0.91 -0.98  -0.93 
Cabernet Sauvignon  -3.67 -3.54 -4.01  -3.74   Cabernet Sauvignon  -2.95 -2.99 -3.10  -3.02 
Cabernet Sauvignon Merlot -2.51 -2.57 -2.63  -2.57   Cabernet Sauvignon Merlot -6.35 -6.40 -6.13  -6.28 
Chianti  -1.00 -1.05 -1.29  -1.11   Chianti  -1.20 -1.30 -1.53  -1.34 
Merlot  -3.32 -3.30 -3.38  -3.33   Merlot  -3.09 -3.09 -3.06  -3.08 
Paisano  -0.78 -0.80 -0.91  -0.83   Paisano  -0.89 -0.92 -0.99  -0.93 
Pinot Noir  -5.01 -5.07 -7.16  -6.05   Pinot Noir  -4.32 -4.36 -4.54  -4.44 
Shiraz  -3.32 -3.32 -3.33  -3.33   Shiraz  -4.15 -4.14 -4.11  -4.13 
Zinfandel  -3.45 -3.52 -3.89  -3.62   Zinfandel  -2.87 -2.94 -3.18  -3.00 
Generic Red Wine  -0.55 -0.56 -0.63  -0.58   Generic Red Wine  -0.64 -0.65 -0.73  -0.67 
                    
Blush  -0.59 -0.60 -0.68  -0.62   Rose  -1.05 -1.07 -1.14  -1.09 
Rose  -0.93 -0.95 -1.09  -0.99   Blush  -0.68 -0.70 -0.78  -0.72 
White Grenache  -0.61 -0.60 -0.65  -0.62   White Grenache  -0.70 -0.69 -0.74  -0.71 
White Zinfandel  -1.49 -1.51 -1.70  -1.56   White Zinfandel  -1.46 -1.48 -1.62  -1.51 
                    
Chablis  -0.77 -0.77 -0.89  -0.81   Chablis  -0.87 -0.88 -0.96  -0.90 
Chardonnay  -2.78 -2.75 -2.95  -2.83   Chardonnay  -2.83 -2.82 -2.86  -2.84 
Pinot Grigio  -3.11 -3.16 -3.15  -3.14   Pinot Grigio  -4.09 -4.07 -3.92  -4.01 
Rhine  -0.70 -0.70 -0.80  -0.73   Rhine  -0.80 -0.80 -0.88  -0.83 
Sauvignon Blanc  -2.61 -2.64 -2.78  -2.68   Sauvignon Blanc  -2.59 -2.63 -2.76  -2.66 
Generic White Wine  -0.57 -0.59 -0.68  -0.61   Generic White Wine  -0.65 -0.66 -0.77  -0.69 
                    
Other Wine  -2.43 -2.45 -2.58  -2.49   Other Wine  -2.78 -2.80 -2.88  -2.82 
                    
All Red Wine  -2.63 -2.65 -3.01  -2.77   All Red Wine  -2.52 -2.60 -2.72  -2.62 
All White Wine  -2.14 -2.17 -2.39  -2.24   All White Wine  -2.28 -2.32 -2.44  -2.35 
All Rose  -1.19 -1.21 -1.35  -1.25   All Rose  -1.21 -1.22 -1.33  -1.25 
                    
Argentina  -2.45 -2.46 -2.46  -2.46            
Australia  -3.25 -3.24 -3.24  -3.25            
Chile  -2.21 -2.22 -2.24  -2.23            
France  -3.67 -3.58 N/A  -3.64            
Germany  -3.11 -3.27 -3.77  -3.40            
Italy  -2.83 -2.87 -3.10  -2.93            
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Table 4 Own price elasticities for quality nesting 
  Basic  Popular Premium  Premium  Super Premium  Ultra Premium  Average 
2003  -0.74  -1.91  -2.86  -3.71  -25.56  -2.12 
2004  -0.75  -1.90  -2.90  -3.76  -25.63  -2.15 
2005  -0.77  -1.88  -2.94  -3.82  -25.63  -2.42 
Average  -0.75  -1.90  -2.90  -3.76  -25.61  -2.23 
 
Table 5 Own price elasticities for region nesting 
  Australia  South America  Europe  United States  Average 
2003  -4.05  -8.21  -4.19  -1.80  -2.16 
2004  -4.00  -8.36  -4.24  -1.83  -2.22 
2005  -3.94  -8.48  -4.46  -1.98  -2.36 
Average  -3.99  -8.36  -4.29  -1.87  -2.25 
 
6. Policy implications 
Several  policy  implications  for  Australian  wine  producers  emerge  from  the  analysis. 
These implications relate to ways in which Australian producers can induce sales in the 
US market, with the goal of reducing disequilibrium in the Australian wine industry. 
Price elasticities presented in Section 5 provide insight into how price can be used to 
achieve  this  end.  However,  price  has  been  shown  to  be  an  ineffective  tool  in  some 
circumstances. Alternate non-price policies, such as promotion and bundling, must be 
developed  for  these  situations.  The  competitive  situation  in  the  United  States  is  also 
discussed, with recommendations on how Australian producers can their competitiveness. 
It becomes evident in this discussion, that there are no “blanket” policies that can address 
the problem of disequilibrium in the Australian wine industry. Australian producers may 
need to employ a range of policies to address this problem. 
  From Table 2 it can be seen that US consumers have a preference for Cabernet 
Sauvignon and Merlot grape varieties. These varieties have also been found to exhibit 
relatively elastic demand (Table 3). Being some of the greatest culprits of the aggregate-
level oversupply that exists in the Australian wine industry (Davis 2005), the US market 
may provide a viable means of reducing excess stocks. The findings of this analysis 
suggest that sales of Cabernet Sauvignon and Merlot could be increased significantly, if 
price discounting is employed by Australian exporters.   18 
  White Grenache, a Rosé-style wine, is relatively price inelastic in the US market. 
Like  Cabernet  Sauvignon  and  Merlot,  Grenache  is  a  variety  that  has  contributed  to 
oversupply in Australia. However, the inelastic demand of White Grenache indicates that 
price  discounting  would  be  an  inefficient  method  of  surplus  disposal.  Australian 
producers may be more successful producing Rosé-style wine with Grenache grapes, and 
exporting it to the United States branded as Blush. The popularity of Blush with US 
consumers (see Table 2) may provide Australian producers with an opportunity to reduce 
excess Grenache stocks, while its inelastic demand may enable prices to be increased 
with little effect on sales. Therefore, despite price discounting being an inferior surplus 
disposal  policy  in  the  case  of  Grenache,  non-price  alternatives  such  as  a  change  in 
branding, may be used to achieve the same objective. 
Table 4 shows group share price elasticities for the quality model over the three 
years in the sample. As expected the demand for higher quality wine is more responsive 
to price changes. This implies that price discounting is more effective when implemented 
on high quality wines. Relatively little reward is attainable from reducing the price of low 
quality wine, and will most likely lead to a fall in profitability. In this segment non-price 
strategies, such as promotion, bundling and tying wine, are likely to provide a more 
effective way of increasing sales. Such a strategy was recently implemented in Australia 
where a small wine rack was bundled with the purchase of a particular wine. The effect 
on the consumer was two-fold. Initially, bundling was used to create a perception of 
greater “value for money”. From then onwards, “tying” was used to induce repeat sales, 
as the wine rack encouraged the storage of wine. Promotional strategies such as this 
appear more effective in driving sales in lower quality segments of the market. 
The results also provide some insight into competition in the US market. This is 
an important issue for Australian producers to consider if they wish to enhance their 
market share. Australia must consider all other producers in the market as legitimate 
competitors, however, these producers may be competitive in varying capacities. From 
the perspective of price competition, Table 5 indicates that South American producers 
have  the  most  ability  to  induce  sales,  potentially  as  Australia’s  expense,  via  price 
discounting. However, the findings of this analysis suggest that US consumers of South 
American wines have highly homogenous tastes. The opposite appears to be the case for   19 
Australian  wine.  This  implies  that  if  Australia  were  to  continually  innovate  and 
differentiate its products, it might be able to distance itself South America’s competitive 
advantage on price. 
In  contrast,  consumers  of  domestically  produced  wine  appear  to  be  the  most 
heterogeneous  of  all  regions  in  the  US  market.  For  this  reason,  increasing  product 
diversity would have the effect of drawing Australia into direct competition with the 
United States. Tables 3 and 5 suggest that the price elasticity for Australian wine in the 
US market is significantly higher than that of domestically produced wine. A one percent 
decrease in price will yield approximately a four percent increase in sales. This is in 
contrast to US producers who can expect around a two percent rise in sales. This implies 
that Australia may become more successful in competing with US produced wine by 
competing on price. 
The  results  also  provide  some  information  on  the  outlook  of  the  US  market. 
Analysing the past trends in elasticities over time, it may be possible to gain an idea of 
the path the market may take in the future. In general, across the three years in the sample 
price elasticities for wine in the United States have steadily increased. This suggests that 
US consumers have become more price conscious over time. Given that elasticities of 
individual product attributes (Table 3) are also showing an upward trend, it appears that 
price  has  become  an  increasingly  powerful  tool  in  influencing  the  behaviour  of  US 
consumers. However, from the perspective of Australia, the opposite appears to be the 
case,  with  a  gradual  fall  in  price  elasticity  over  time.  The  effectiveness  of  price 
discounting,  therefore,  has  fallen  for  Australian  wine,  while  it  has  increased  for  its 
competitors.  Therefore,  Australian  producers  need  to  be  aware  that  “following”  the 
actions and marketing strategies of their competitors, particularly those that are price-
orientated,  may  not  provide  a  favourable  outcome.  It  is  important  for  Australian 
producers  to  combine  pricing  policies  with  an  emphasis  on  promotion  and  market 
exposure, in order to enhance market share. 
 
7. Concluding comments 
The present study has used a product differentiation model of demand to provide some 
insight into the consumer preferences for wine in the United States, one of Australia’s   20 
largest export markets. It was proposed that this information might identify strategies by 
which Australian producers could enhance market share in the US market, which would 
in turn help to reduce the disequilibrium that exists in the Australian wine industry. It has 
been found that the wine types that US consumers prefer are generally those that have 
experienced excess production in Australia. This implies that the US market may be a 
viable means of surplus disposal for Australian producers. However, the tools with which 
Australian  producers  induce  increased  sales  differ  depending  on  the  wine  type  in 
question.  Pricing  has  been  shown  not  to  always  be  the  best  tool  of  competition, 
particularly in the lower quality segments of the market. In these situations non-price 
strategies, such as promotion, bundling and tying, may be used more effectively. It has 
also been found that of all wine producing countries in the sample, Australia is the only 
one  where  price  discounting  has  become  increasingly  ineffective  over  time.  This 
indicates that Australia must differentiate away from its competition, and adopt more 
innovative marketing strategies in order to increase market share. 
  Areas of further work include the derivation of cross-price elasticities for market 
segments  and  product  attributes.  Equation  15  can  be  used  to  achieve  this  end.  It  is 
important to understand the demand for individual products in the US wine market, but it 
is also vital to gauge the interaction of various products. For example, if Australian wines 
are  close  substitutes  (high  cross-price  elasticity  within  Australian  wines),  price 
discounting to cause an increase in sales may simply lead to the cannibalisation of sales 
from other Australian wines, thereby having little positive effect on Australian industry-
level  disequilibrium  problems.  It  is  important  to  ensure  that  such  a  policy  leads  to 
increases in market share at the expense of Australia’s competitors, rather than other 
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